Intentionally, there is no obvious state involvement. In his attack, the assassin dies or melts into the crowd, providing no proof of who is responsible. This tactic is meant to confuse and frustrate a legally justifiable response, as the Western paradigm based on the 1648 Peace of Westphalia assumes a state-versus-state conflict. Avoiding giving the West a defined, obvious state opponent is a rational strategy peculiar to the Arab way of war.

The Arab combat style imposes small financial burden on its parent societies, allowing long and protracted wars without inflicting economic hardship. Employing only small numbers of personnel with few needs, wars can be financed privately and seemingly remain independent of overt government support. Such entrepreneurs can be hard to trace and impossible to stop.

Although the tactics of the Arab system rely almost completely on the civilian technology and resources of those nations being attacked, the assassins generally originate from another nation-state. A specific government may not support assassins openly, but to thrive the assassins rely on the acquiescence, sympathy, and often active support of the population from which they came. A society has created them and continues to provide financing, safe harbor, and training. Edmund Burke noted in 1729 that "the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." The silence of the good men of the Middle East implies a terrible consent.