"Alas, to wear the mantle of Galileo it is not enough that you be persecuted by an unkind establishment, you must also be right."
---Robert Park
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MentalBlocks
Throwing Mental Blocks at Glass Constructions
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Friday, September 12, 2003
This just came up again on den Beste: John Fonte's 'The Ideological War Within the West', an explanation of transnational progressivism.
10:53 AM
Tuesday, September 09, 2003
James Dunnigan ponders "media victories" in asymmetrical warfare. This is something I've been thinking about, as well. The problem occurs when journalists develop a bias that prevents them from observing and disseminating all the relevant information, or when the relevant information is unobtainable. For example, what if some enterprising journalist had managed to both discover the mindset of the Somali militia after the battle of Mogadishu, and gotten the information printed and/or screened widely by news editors who were likely determined to see it as a "destroy the village to save it" situation? Would the political will have been found to carry on and destroy the tribal militia? Would this have enabled the foundation of a modern state in Somalia?
I don't know the exact answers, but it seems to me that the best answer o the problems of media warfare is to get a more complete information universe to the public. Sadly, the established journalistic institutions have proved themselves incapable of presenting the whole picture of anything, and will have to be worked around.
Asymmetric warfare is a hot new topic, portraying the fearsome prospect of high tech American troops brought low by less well equipped, but better thought out, foes. Somalia, in 1993 (“Black Hawk Down”), and Iraq, in 2003 (RPGs from every direction) are touted as meaningful lessons of the power of asymmetric warfare.
But let us know forget that asymmetric warfare works both ways. In Somalia, the Somalis took over 30 casualties for every American killed or wounded. That was done through the use of superior American training, firepower (on the ground, and in helicopters overhead) and situational awareness (helicopters and more radios.) The battle in Mogadishu is only considered an American defeat because the American government considered 18 dead G.I.’s a defeat, even if over 500 Somali fighters died as well. At the time, the Somalis considered themselves defeated, and feared the return of the Army Rangers the next day to finish off the Somali militia that was terrorizing Mogadishu. The media declared the battle an American defeat, and that’s how it became known. Asymmetric warfare includes having the media in your corner, for that can easily turn a military defeat into a media victory.
The same thing almost happened in Iraq in 2003. During the first two weeks of the American advance into Iraq, any real, apparent or imagined delay of the coalition forces was instantly declared the beginning of a coalition defeat. Even as American troops moved within sight of Baghdad, the pundits were still gravely talking about bloody house to house fighting. There was much talk of asymmetric warfare by the Iraqis, and there was a lot of guerilla type attacks. But the American troops came up with new tactics faster than the Iraqis could think of ways to get around the American advantages.
Using the media as an asymmetric warfare weapon is pretty common, and sometimes it works. It worked in Somalia. It worked several times in the Balkans during the 1990s. Islamic fundamentalists use the media as one of their more potent weapons. The use of imbedded reporters during the Iraq war is seen by the Department of Defense as a use of asymmetric warfare against potentially dangerous media. Indeed, many media pundits have said as much, and darkly warn that the media cannot tolerate more such "defeats" in the future.
10:37 AM
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